way that has consequences for both agents. Lewis assumed common interest and common knowledge between sender and receiver, and his model gave a simple account of how rational choice could stabilize the rules of behavior on "each side" of the sign, the rule of production (mapping states of the world to messages) and the rule of interpretation (mapping messages to acts). 2 Relevant works in this tradition, beside those discussed in detail in this section, include Millikan (1984) , Skyrms (2010) , Farrell and Rabin (1996) , Zollman et al. (2013) , Searcy and Nowicki (2003) , Godfrey-Smith (2013) . 3 Lewis's terminology distinguished "communicator" and "audience." C.S. Peirce is sometimes seen as the father of this family of ideas, but within the framework of this paper, his is a receiverfocused view. See Godfrey-Smith (2014) for discussion of the Peirce framework and its influence on some recent scientific work.
The simplest models assume common interest between sender and receiver. This is especially clear in the case of the Lewis model, where the sender's messages guide the receiver by reducing uncertainty about the state of the world (carrying information, in Shannon's 1948 sense) . It would seem that if the sender and receiver want different acts performed in any given state of the world, then if the sender makes information about this state available to the receiver, the information will be used to produce actions that the sender does not want performed. In such a situation, the sender would have no incentive to signal informatively and hence the receiver no reason to listen. At equilibrium, silence should reign. If this line of argument is accepted, the next question to ask is what happens when there is partial common interest between the two agents. That question is the topic the role of common interest given above. We devised a measure of common interest between sender and receiver, called C, that requires weaker assumptions than Crawford and Sobel's and other models. Our measure compares the preference orderings that each agent has over actions that might be produced in each state of the world. There is complete common interest (C=1) when sender and receiver agree entirely about their rankings of actions for every state; there is complete conflict of interest when they have reversed orderings in every state (C=0). That is, there is complete conflict when in every state of the world, the best action for one agent is the worst for the other. We assumed "cheap talk" (no signal costs) and no iteration of play between agents. Across a large sample of three-state games and using two different methodologies (a static "Nash equilibrium" search and a dynamic model), we found that our measure C is strongly predictive of whether communication can be maintained at all, and of how informative the messages in the system will be. (The "informativeness" of communication is measured as the mutual information between states of the world and the receiver's acts.)
We also found surprises; there are cases where informative communication is possible effective because the receiver's response has also evolved" (p. 3). A cue, in contrast, is a something an organism can use to guide their action, but which did not evolve as a guide of this kind; it is a byproduct of other processes, or a consequence of fixed physical constraints. Maynard Smith and Harper use the example of a mosquito finding a mammal to bite by tracking CO 2 . Carbon dioxide can be used by the mosquito as a cue of the location of a nearby mammal, but it is not a signal sent by the mammal. In the terms used here, the production of CO 2 by mammals is not part of a sender's rule that coevolved with the mosquito's use of CO 2 as a "receiver" or "interpreter." The mammal would prefer not to give the mosquito any information about its location, but -as we might say -it can't help doing so. CO 2 is an unsent sign. It is produced, but not because of a coevolved sending rule. 6 The vagueness of my phrase above, "can't help doing so," shows another feature of the situation. If avoiding mosquitoes was sufficiently important to mammals, and some sort of sequestering of CO 2 would keep mosquitoes away, we might imagine a situation in which mammals did evolve such sequestering. In a simple sketch of the mosquito case we assume that producing a trackable plume of CO 2 is a fixed constraint, but it is subject to evolution. There are many cases where the "sending" done by an animal is evolving, but in a more constrained and slower way than the "receiving" side is evolving. The other relationship is possible too; Owren, Rendall, and Ryan have recently argued, in effect, that this is seen in some important actual cases of animal communication: a sender can successfully exploit a receiver by making use of biases in the receiver's perceptual and neural mechanisms. The situation is not one in which the receiver cannot evolve its these mechanisms to counteract the sender's efforts, but, they argue, evolution of these mechanisms on the receiver's side is subject to more constraints.
7
The cue/signal distinction concerns the role of the sender. In other literatures, "signal" is used to refer to simple signs in which the timing of production is important.
The making and use of this book (or its chapters) fits a sender-receiver model, for example, but a book is not a usually "signal." In yet another literature, in microbiology, "signal transduction" includes the use of cues as well as signals in the sense above (Lyon 2015) . I don't want terminology to be a distraction here, so I'll keep using "sign" in a broad way and sometimes use other terms that should be clear in the immediate context. 6 As Maynard Smith and Harper put it, "the crucial point is that the signal must be able to evolve independently of any quality of the signaler [or other variable] about which it conveys information" (2003, p. 4) . 7 See their (2010). I discuss Owren et al.'s views about exploitation in more detail in GodfreySmith (2013) . The description of their view given here is what I take to be the most plausible interpretation; sometimes they, like Dawkins and Krebs before them (1978) , appear to hold that senders have the upper hand in principle in such interactions. I think there's no reason why this should be the case, and the best way to present their sender-focused view is to do so in the way I have here in the text.
Organized Sign Systems and Combinatorial Structure
This section discusses combinatorial structure in signs and communication media.
Whereas the previous section aimed to describe what I take to be a consensus, even if implicit, in this section I'll set things up differently from some other authors, though I take the ideas here to be a natural extension of those above. another. Rather than signaling land versus sea, suppose the sexton only used one lantern, but the brighter the lantern was, the bigger the army he'd seen. Here there is a natural relation between different signs -the brighter than relation -that maps to a natural relation between armies -the larger than relation. The sexton might instead have used a dimmer lantern for a larger army; that system would work just as well, provided the receiver's rule of interpretation was coordinated with it.
In the case where lantern brightness maps to army size, the sign system is an organized one. The actual one-if-by-land... rule, in contrast, yielded a purely nominal sign system. But in both those cases there is no internal structure in the signs themselves; there 8 This terminology modifies one used by Gallistel and King (2010) . 9 Formally, a relation is often identified with a set of ordered pairs (or n-tuples). The term "natural" is supposed to strengthen this. This section owes much to discussions with Ron Planer, though he should not be seen as endorsing the analysis.
is nothing like a syntax. The signs have no internal parts that can be rearranged. An animal alarm call system in which calls are louder (or quieter) when predators are nearer is also a case like this; the sign system is organized even though it has no syntax. Often, though, the way an organized sign system is achieved is by means of syntax and internal structure. The signs in the system are related to each other by the sharing of constituents, which can be recombined and rearranged. Bob arrived and Bob left are related by their shared constituent Bob. This shared constituent is a feature of the signs that matters to their interpretation. Both say something about a particular individual, Bob.
Sharing a constituent is a natural relation between signs, and it maps to a sharing of constituents between the states of affairs described.
Combinatorial structure is one kind of organization in a sign system, one way that signs can be related to each other by communicatively significant transformations.
Having parts is a means to organization in my sense. There are other means which don't involve internal structure, as in the case where a louder call maps to a closer threat. The important distinction in this area is not whether or not a sign has parts. All physical things have parts (at least at this scale). The question is whether the signs' parts have some role in the sender-receiver system, whether the rules of production and interpretation are sensitive to a particular kind of internal structure in the signs.
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Suppose the sexton's rule is: show one lantern per British brigade. That is a feature of the sender's rule, and it may or may not be coordinated with the receiver's rule.
Revere might have a receiver's rule that takes this into account, or he might not. facto organization on the receiver side, too. A louder call might make the receiver more agitated, just as a result of general features of their perceptual psychology, and this agitation might be a good -or a bad -thing with respect to their response to the call.
Initially these features might be inadvertent, but they may then come to figure in the coevolution of senders' and receivers' behaviors. They might be amplified, suppressed, or transformed. In principle, there can be useable structure in signs that is unused by the receivers. There can also be a situation where structure is present in signs, not because of an evolved sender's rule, but by happenstance. This structure, too, might be used or not used by receivers. Suppose the sexton intends to signal in exactly the same way for any sea invasion, but he does not. His alarm call is inadvertently affected by the details, and Revere may or may not pick up on this.
Now I'll combine this with a point made at the end of previous section. There is another situation where a kind of sign structure arises not by a coevolved sender's rulenot by "design" -but by happenstance. Suppose you hear a lion's roar followed by the bellow of an antelope. You might use this to build a scenario about what's going on.
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The two pieces, roar and bellow, each play a role. Two roars will be different from one, also (there are two lions to deal with if I go to the waterhole). In cases like this, a structured combination of sounds or other signs makes possible a certain sort of interpretation, but the interpretation is directed at an object whose combinatorial structure is not due to an evolved sender's rule. Instead, there are simpler behaviors of sign production. When they are put together, they yield a structured and interpretable object, but no agent on the sender's side is following a rule of combinatorial sign production. In the lion-antelope case, there is just a useful happenstance combination of simple signs.
These distinctions have grey areas at their boundaries. For example, how do we distinguish a single combinatorially structured sign from a sequence of unstructured, nominal signs from the same sender? Sometimes this is easy, because the parts of the structured sign could not occur on their own. In other cases, the parts might be able to occur on their own, but an argument might be made that their role in a sequence is one 11 I don't know whether a lion would actually roar when trying to attack an antelope -my case where the effect is the sum of the parts, so it's not a genuinely combinatorial system.
But if this "sum" talk is to be literally applicable, the parts have to be signs that can be produced, and reacted to, in isolation. In the bee dance, the angle of the dance maps direction and the duration of the runs maps distance. For this to be a sum-of-parts case, it would have to be possible for a bee to dance with a definite direction but no definite duration, and with a definite duration but no direction. At least the latter does make sense, though the former might be doubted. If this separation is not possible, then the angle and duration are more akin to syntactic features of a structured sign. The sentence Bob arrived is not the "sum" of Bob and arrived, in the relevant sense. The word arrived cannot achieve anything in isolation, such that we might ask whether this effect is "summed" with the effect of Bob when someone interprets Bob arrived.
Baboons and Cephalopods
With this framework in hand, let's now look at some of the primate behaviors described This case is interesting in the light of the distinction between signals and cues, discussed above. The baboons who call are both signaling; the calls are not mere cues.
But the combinatorial structure (such as it is) in what the receiver hears is cue-like. It is a fortuitous consequence of the social ecology and the rules of nominal sign production being followed by individuals. When I say it is "fortuitous," I don't mean it's an accident.
The evolution of call production was shaped by the social ecology of baboon life, and this social ecology includes the fact that pairs of calls, as well as individual calls, can be heard. That fact might have been important. But there is no sender anywhere in this system whose behaviors of sign production have been shaped by selection for making calls with combinatorial structure. The structure in the calls is fortuitous in that sense.
There's a contrast between the way Seyfarth and Cheney present their ideas in "The Social Origins of Language" and in their book Baboon Metaphysics (2007). In the book, they use data of this kind to make a case for internal sophistication in baboons.
They argue for a system of internal representation in these animals, for something like a "language of thought" (p. 251). The hypothesis of a language of thought might be too strong given the data, as Elisabeth Camp has argued (2009). But the data do support claims of cognitive sophistication and a kind of internal symbolic structure on the interpreter side. In their new paper, though, these results are described as showing the presence of a system of communication rather than just a system of internal interpretation. In response, Seyfarth and Cheney might say that the first result does indeed establish the second. Once we've shown that the baboons' way of assessing calls has a certain kind of complexity, this shows that the communication system itself has that sort of complexity. Their chapter contains passages that suggest this interpretation. 13 I am arguing, however, that with respect to combinatorial structure, it takes two to tango.
Am I merely insisting on one particular way of dividing things up? Suppose they reply: "it's a combinatorial system if the receiver treats it that way." What is wrong with that? I agree there will be many reasonable ways to categorize the cases. But considerable progress has resulted from focusing on sender-receiver coevolution, and in the light of that framework, a combinatorial system is one with complementary features on each side.
There has to be a combinatorial nature to the making of signs, and to their interpretation.
The sender constructs a sign with internal structure and the receiver is sensitive to that structure. Cases with complexity on just one side are important in their own right, but they're important as a different sort of phenomenon.
If we look at things this way, we can identify a complementary case, a flipside, to the baboons' combination of features. This is skin patterning in the coleoid cephalopods (octopuses, cuttlefish, and squid). These animals have the ability to change their skin color and pattern in dramatic ways in less than a second. Larger cuttlefish, such as the Australian Giant Cuttlefish (Sepia apama), are probably the most spectacular, especially with respect to colorfulness, but each group has its specialties (Hanlon and Messenger 1996, Darmaillacq, Dickel, & Mather 2014) . Octopuses can achieve astonishing camouflage, and squid, as discussed below, are perhaps the most communicative. In all these animals, the color and pattern changes are controlled to a considerable extent by the brain. Their skin contains several color-affecting components. Most importantly, chromatophores are sacs of pigment which can be expanded and contracted in precise ways with muscles. Other cells, below the chromatophore layer, reflect ambient light. I'll focus on chromatophores, the most precisely controlled elements in the skin.
The skin of one of these animals contains large numbers of chromatophore units.
They can be used to make both static and dynamic patterns, with a huge variety possible.
A cuttlefish, for example, has three chromatophore colors, and of the order of a million chromatophores across its skin. Control does not seem to be literally chromatophore by chromatophore; they tend to work in clumps. But there is still a large number of independently controllable units, and as a result a vast number of patterns possible at a time. Color and pattern can also change rapidly over time.
So on the production side, there is enormous complexity. What is it for? It is believed that the original function was probably camouflage, and in some species the system has been pressed into a signaling function as well, both intraspecific and interspecific. Some species of cuttlefish have elaborate contests between males, which include displays, and male-female signaling is also common. Octopuses appear to use signaling less than other coleoids (though see Huffard et al. 2008, and Scheel et al. in preparation) . In all these cases, though, it is likely that the interpretation side is vastly simpler than the production side. I'll discuss a possible partial exception in a moment, and in some species there is more complex signaling than in others. But a great deal of combinatorial capacity is probably going unused here, especially on the interpretation side.
The species for which the strongest claims about signal complexity have been made is a reef squid, Sepioteuthis sepioidea, in the Caribbean. Martin Moynihan and
Arcadio Rodaniche (1982) , in a very readable monograph that is an underwater analogue of Baboon Metaphysics, argued that these squid employ a "language" on their skin. Reef squid are social, forming shifting groups of six to twelve or more. They have fairly complex courting behaviors, some low-key territoriality, and they also display at predatory fish. Moynihan and Rodaniche charted the combinations of patterns produced and how they were combined with arm positions, and they found quite a rich structure (see figure 1) . They then argued that squid have a visual language with a syntax. This claim was based mainly on the structure seen in sequences of basic displays, though they also discussed combinations of patterns present at a time.
Among cephalopod biologists these claims of language and syntax have generally Moynihan and Rodaniche counted about 31 ritualized patterns. They believed that systematic patterns in the sequence with which these displays were produced must have some meaning:
We cannot, ourselves, in the present state of our knowledge, always and in every case tell the difference in message or meaning between every observed arrangement of particular patterns. We feel, nevertheless, that we must assume that there is a real functional difference of some sort between any two sequences or combinations that can be distinguished from one another. body patterns and two concealment ones, but these are not presented as exhaustive. In other work, Mather along with her collaborators distinguishes more basic displays (Mather et al. 2004 , Byrne et al. 2003 , some of which include body posture as well as skin patterning. I don't know of later studies that recognize the full variety discussed in Moynihan and Rodaniche.
discusses the difficulty of tracking receivers' interpretations of displays.
It may be that in reef squid there is a hidden role for some of the rich combinatorial structure in displays discussed by Moynihan and Rodaniche. This would probably involve subtle and graded modulation of the basic behaviors associated with aggression and sex. It's possible. We could then ask, as Scott-Phillips does, questions about whether a receiver's responses to combinations of signals have an additive relation to their parts, and so on. In other cephalopods this sort of complex signaling is even more unlikely. Reef squid are more social than other coleiod cephalopods. Octopuses, in particular, are not very social at all, though they produce rich combinations of patterns and color changes, many of which do not, apparently, involve camouflage.
How then should we think about complex pattern production in cephalopods? A partial explanation comes just from noting its origins in camouflage. Camouflage, especially in reef environments, involves producing spatially structured patterns, and that is the likely origin of the pattern-producing machinery. Once pressed into service for communication, in a situation where displays are meant to be seen and understood, rather than not seen, the result is a lot of combinatorial capacity on the production side. Some displays made by cephalopods to other species are probably designed to startle the other animal, and these "deimatic" displays are very spatially complex, but intended to have simple results. At least in squid, and perhaps in some other cases, there is probably some genuine combinatorial structure to communicative displays between individuals, but there is probably also a great deal of unused capacity and unattended complexity. The interpretation rules in play are probably not tracking much of the combinatorial detail that is inherent to the production mechanisms. In the squid case, Moynihan and Rodaniche probably did enough to show that the production of combinations is not merely random.
This is not so clear in other cases. Offering a speculative hypothesis, I suspect (based on informal observations) that some complex cephalopod displays are non-random but also functionless; they are fortuitous reflections of internal processes, byproducts of the close connections between brain and chromatophores, that do not have a comparably complex coevolved interpretation. The complex displays indicate something about the animal, but what is indicated is not being used (much) by normal receivers. Perhaps this is not true, but even if false in all cases, its possibility illustrates how the complexity of sign production can outrun the complexity of interpretation in a system of animal communication.
The cephalopod case is a complement to the baboons, the flipside. In the baboons there is much complexity on the receiver side, but it is aimed at sign structure that is not put in place by any sender. A communication system that is genuinely complex and combinatorial is one in which rich combinatorial structure figures into the rules on both sides of the signs, rather than a system in which simple nominal signs are produced but complex interpretations are possible given the social context, and rather than a system with very complex production but where most of the complexity is insignificant to interpreters. Especially in philosophy, but also in scientific discussions, there is a tendency to "choose sides" when giving a theoretical description of communication.
Some people treat communication as a fundamentally expressive phenomenon, and emphasize the sender side (in philosophy, see Grice); other views see communication as a fundamentally interpretive phenomenon, and emphasize the receiver side (in philosophy, see Davidson) . 15 The coevolutionary framework shows us that sides should not be chosen. * * *
